

THE ROAD TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL - ECIM

Abstract

Great challenges brought about by difficult economic and financial conditions, on one hand, and the trend of growth, sophistication and globalization of organized crime, on the other hand, equally affect Member States of the European Union, as well as other European countries; thus, the creation of the European space of safety and justice is needed more than ever. This can be achieved through mutual cooperation and consolidation of cross-border police cooperation based on the development of national police forces, integration of already established EU framework and instruments in the area of justice and home affairs and strengthening of information exchange between police organizations, with the aim of implementing the European Criminal Intelligence Model. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the circumstances in terms of adoption, development and implementation of the European Criminal Intelligence Model- ECIM as part of the European Union Internal Security Strategy. If we add to that the fact that one of the priority tasks of our country, in line with harmonization with EU regulations, is the requirement for compliance with the European Criminal Intelligence Model, then this paper, from the aspect of its contribution, gains in importance. The contribution of this paper in this domain should be evaluated in light of the current absence of a strategy and clear path towards implementation of such method of police work despite European (and world) actuality.

Key words: *The European Criminal Intelligence Model – ECIM; Criminal Intelligence; Europol; SOCTA; Intelligence-Led Policing.*

1. Introduction

EU security policy has acquired a multidimensional character in the past decade, due to new forms of emerging threats and challenges as

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well as varied types of response. The levels of EU security policy differed in many respects, subject to issues, areas, methods, tools and policies applied to cope with detected or identified problems. Approaches worked out for the effective operation in particular fields of security were aiming to tackle any single issue in a specific manner, giving thus opportunity for EU institutions and agencies to intervene in political, economic, diplomatic, or even military way. Before 9/11, however, EU justice and home affairs cooperation, despite its reinforcement as a result of the 1999 Amsterdam reform of EU treaty law, was relatively loose and dependent on Member States' particular interests or national determinants.

The events of 9/11 highlighted the critical importance of intelligence for effective prevention and combating of terrorism and transnational crime. However, it did not have any special impact on the capabilities of EU legal and institutional arrangements to establish a genuine Intelligence-Led Policing model. Some attempts at intensifying and enlarging the scope of intelligence cooperation at EU level, due to the lack of unanimity and the deficit of trust among the Member States, did not yield the expected results.²

This picture altered in the immediate aftermaths of the 11 March 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid. The EU's institutions placed particular emphasis on the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States and called for the improvement of mechanisms for cooperation and the promotion of effective systematic collaboration between police, security and intelligence services. The European Council in the Hague Programme of November 2004 set the goal of „setting up and implementing a methodology for intelligence-led law enforcement at EU level“.³ A British proposal submitted to Interior Ministers gathered at an informal meeting in September 2005 contained what may have been considered the “missing link” in the creation of a potential EU intelligence tradecraft.⁴ A consultation paper delivered by the UK Home Office introduced the idea of a European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) based on the principles of Intelligence-Led Policing and evidently inspired by the UK's National Intelligence Model.⁵ The ECIM was marked by a „shift from reactive policing to a problem solving approach, based on analysis, by developing action plans (focused on crime prevention as well as on repressive action) and involving multiple actors

² O. Bures, „EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?“, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18/2006, 62-63.

³ European Council, 'The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union', *Official Journal of the European Union* C 53, 3 March 2004, 9.

⁴ A. Gruszczak, "Intelligence tradecraft and the pre-crime approach to EU internal security governance", Paper to the UACES 43rd Annual Conference, Leeds, 2-4 September 2013, 13.

⁵ UK Presidency, „A European Criminal Intelligence Model“, paper issued by the 2005 UK Presidency of the EU, 2005, 1.

(both private and public partners)”⁶.

Europol was pointed as the central EU capability to receive, store and analyse this collected information and to support operational activities of the Member States based on Europol’s earlier strategic assessments. Europol was also tasked to lead the further development of the ECIM.

The aim of this paper is, first, to present through a comparative analysis the development of the European legal framework, institutions and instruments for the establishment of the European Criminal Intelligence Model as part of the EU Internal Security Strategy. In the second part of the paper, the focus will be on revealing the European Criminal Intelligence Model and analysis of Europol as a central institution in the development of the ECIM, as well as on the presentation of the key document SOCTA (Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment) as a basis for a strategic approach to the ECIM in identifying of priorities and instructions for work.

2. European framework, institutions and instruments

At the European Union political level, the first efforts towards an integrated approach to police or criminal intelligence were made through the adoption of the Hague Programme and the Stockholm Programme but, more significantly, through the changes of the EU treaties brought by the Lisbon Treaty. The Hague and Stockholm Programmes identified the need for the consolidation of the cross-border police cooperation through different instruments for which the common thread is the exchange of various types of police information in the EU, whereas the Lisbon Treaty provides the EU with modern institutions and optimised working methods to address, among other issues, the security of the EU citizens.

The 2004 Hague programme⁷ requested the Member States as well as the European responsible institutions to adopt innovative approaches to cross-border exchange of law-enforcement information with the view to creating a space of freedom, security and justice. The programme postulates the principle of availability of police information throughout the European Union and establishes a set of key conditions which should be strictly observed:

- the exchange may only take place in order that legal tasks may be performed;

⁶ Council of the EU, Result of the “Harmony” project - “A generic European Crime Intelligence Model - Bringing together the existing instruments and strengthening Europol’s central role“, doc. 14851/10, Brussels, 25 October 2010, 8.

⁷ Council of the European Union, *The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union*, General Secretariat, Brussels, 13 December 2004, 16054/04.

- the integrity of the data to be exchanged must be guaranteed;
- the need to protect sources of information and to secure the confidentiality of the data at all stages of the exchange, and subsequently;
- common standards for data access and common technical standards must be applied;
- supervision of respect for data protection, and appropriate control prior to and after the exchange must be ensured;
- individuals must be protected from abuse of data and have the right to seek correction of incorrect data.⁸

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty defines and implements a common security policy for the EU. It also establishes the shared competences between the Union and the Member States in the area of freedom, security and justice among other areas. The treaty also empowers the European Parliament and the Council to establish measures concerning:

- the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information;
- support for the training of staff, and cooperation on the exchange of staff, on equipment and on research into crime-detection;
- common investigative techniques in relation to the detection of serious forms of organised crime.⁹

The Lisbon Treaty also provides for the creation of a new body, the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation and Internal Security (COSI). COSI was created with the view to facilitating, promoting and strengthening the coordination of EU States' operational actions in the area of internal security. It consists of high-level officials from EU States' ministries of the interior and of Commission representatives. However, other relevant bodies may be invited to attend COSI's meetings as observers.¹⁰

The Stockholm programme¹¹ adopted by the European Council in 2010 looks upon the idea of developing, over a period of 5 years, the specific framework with the view to creating an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union. The aspects concerning the management of police information are contained in Chapter 4 of

⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, "The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice", 2005.

⁹ Official Journal of the European Union – "The Lisbon Treaty" (Chapter 5 - Police Cooperation), C 306/2007, 67. http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm, November 9th 2015.

¹⁰ European Commission, Home Affairs Section, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/>, November 9th 2015.

¹¹ Council of the EU, *The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen*, Brussels, 17024/09, 2 December 2009.

the Programme which deals with the Internal Security of the European Union. Indicative of the importance of criminal intelligence within the Programme is the fact that one of the pivotal principles around which the EU internal security strategy should be developed is that of a proactive and intelligence-led approach as well as a further improvement of their information exchange.

The Stockholm programme acknowledges a wide choice of toolbox for collecting, processing and sharing of information between national authorities and other European players and upholds the principle of availability as established by the Hague Programme.

A step forward in improvement and creation of the European security model was made on 25 and 26 March 2010, when the European Union Internal Security Strategy was adopted, by which citizens' needs were aligned with the challenges of the XXI century, with the following fundamental goals: protecting rights and freedoms; improving cooperation and solidarity between Member States; addressing the causes of insecurity and not just the effects; prioritising prevention and anticipation; involving all sectors with a role to play in public protection (political, economic, social, etc.); communicating security policies to the citizens; and, finally, recognising the interdependence between internal and external security in establishing a „global security” approach with third countries.¹²

3. European Criminal Intelligence Model – ECIM

The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, introduced the basic principles of Criminal Intelligence activity which represent the ground for the establishment of the European Criminal Intelligence Model based on the principles of Intelligence-Led Policing – ILP. In this respect, the Council of the European Union invited EU Member States to allow Europol to take a key position, i.e. a role in the fight against organized crime and terrorism, by establishing a legal basis for mandatory submission of Intelligence and information by EU Member States to Europol, as well as a mutual exchange of information.

Agreement on the establishment of the European Criminal Intelligence Model – ECIM was reached at the meeting of the European Ministers of Home Affairs in 2005.¹³ It sets up a new strategy for information sharing among Law enforcement agencies of Member States and Europol.

¹² Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, 8–9.

¹³ Annex-A European Criminal Intelligence Model, Justice and Home Affairs Informal, 8-9 September 2005. www.eu2005.gov.uk

In 2005, the UK Home Office published, under the UK Presidency of the European Union, a consultation paper¹⁴ which firstly introduced the idea of a European Criminal Intelligence Model based on the aforementioned principles of intelligence-led policing. In this context the UK Presidency advanced the idea of a European Criminal Intelligence Model which would deliver benefits in particular by:

- improving common knowledge of serious and organised crime through a more effective collection, exchange, and analysis of information; increasing the effectiveness of Europol and other EU bodies;
- achieving better operational results in the highest priority areas; achieving greater accountability to Ministers in delivering action against Council priorities;
- and allowing all Member States and relevant EU institutions to observe a common methodology for tackling serious and organised crime in the EU.

In this way, the ECIM was assigned a role to secure a more efficient decrease of serious (severe) forms of crime in the field of European security, depending on the level of threat or vulnerability. It is achieved through the Criminal Intelligence Process whose aim is to identify criminal threats on the basis on Intelligence submitted to Europol, considering the fact that this institution is a central point for reception, storage and analysis of the collected informations. In accordance with the conclusions of the Hague programme, in 2006 Europol replaced a standard Annual Crime Report with the OCTA – European Union’s Organised Crime Threat Assessment. The Council determined annual priorities and work directions on the basis of the assessment made. Europol’s OCTA became a key element of the model of a proactive crime confronting. In order to improve the quality of OCTA documents, the European Criminal Intelligence Model was intensively developed. In this respect, Member States have put efforts to improve the quality of informations for law enforcement with the assistance of Europol. The document OCTA was developed during 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011.

The OCTA represents an annual *strategic document* developed on the basis of information and Intelligence provided to Europol by Member

¹⁴ Home Office – “A European Criminal Intelligence Model”, Justice and Home Affairs Informal, Newcastle Gateshead, 8-9 September, 2005. If we are to draw a parallel between the European Criminal Intelligence Model and the UK National Intelligence Model, we would undoubtedly notice that the two models are identical. In fact, the only straight forward difference between the two models is their range (national and European level), as the UK paper explains how the European Criminal Intelligence Model would work by using the same intelligence management cycle of turning knowledge into effective action. Also: UK House of Lords European Union Committee, “Europol: Coordinating the Fight against Serious and Organised Crime”, 29th Report of Session 2007-2008, HL Paper 183, 2008, 26.

States. Apart from that, the OCTA also relies on the information received from the states outside the EU as well as from the international law enforcement organisations (such as INTERPOL). Its goal is to manage priorities of Member States through the Police Chief Task Force (PCTF/ COSPOL), by direct dissemination of the assesment document to the law enforcement agencies at national level.

On a practical level, the aim of OCTA is to guide police operations, performed by Member States, by relevant Intelligence which will secure the use of relevant resources of the law enforcement agencies in confronting expected threat.¹⁵ This methodis firmly in line with the decision of the Hague programme that activities directed towards fighting organized crime should be conducted more proactively than reactively. In this way, common knowledge about criminal activities and threats increases, identifying the most dangerous criminals and criminal organisations, that is, determining priority fields in order to reduce the area of organized international crime occurrence.

Strategic reports (analysis) OCTA can be:

- A **threat assessment**: contains the analysis and evaluation of the character, scope and impact of criminality (for example, the impact of money laundering on the EU; the impact of South American drug cartels on the EU).
- A **risk assessment**: identifies and examines vulnerable areas of society that are, or could be, criminally exploited; this type of report offers recommendations on potential counter measures.
- A **general situation report**: describes current crime situations in general or specific areas (for example, drug situation in the EU; the amount of money laundered in the EU; the situation on terrorism in the EU).¹⁶

Although it was planned that Member States and their police organisations gradually completely adopt ECIM, there was a wide agreement from the start that this model had helped in harmonizing police practice throughout EU, as well as in introducing “modern” Intelligence-Led Policing and strategic planning.¹⁷ There are also statements of the representatives of the Serious and Organised Crime Organisation (SOCA) testifying on the ECIM support: “*The ECIM model is ushering in a new phase in the development of Europol, establishing the agency as a central*

¹⁵ Europol, „Europol Information Management – Products and Service“, File No. 2510-271, 14. (Europol, *Europol Information Managment*)

¹⁶ Europol – Directorate General Internal Policies, “Development of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OKTA) and Internal Security Architecture: Study”, Doc. No. PE 410.682, Brussels, 2009, 18.

¹⁷ UK House of Lords European Union Committee, “Europol: Coordinating the Fight against Serious and Organised Crime”, 29th Report of Session 2007-2008, HL Paper 183, 2008, 28.

intelligence base in the EU supporting a range of subregional initiatives around the EU. This approach is exactly in line with our aspirations for the organization”.¹⁸

EU Member States tested the new way of work for the first time in 2006. The first threat assessment, made by Europol, set up four regional priorities in fighting organized crime in Europe. Those priorities are:

- The south-eastern region of the EU, with a focus on Turkish and Albanian OC groups;
- The south-western region of the EU, with a focus on certain African OC groups;
- The north-eastern region of the EU, focusing on the Baltic States and the influence of Russian speaking OC;
- The Atlantic region, revolving mainly around the pivotal transnational role of Dutch, British and Belgian criminal organisations.¹⁹

During Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2009, Harmonization Project was launched, that is, the project of integration of EU instruments, including the OCTA, in a higher-level, more consistent and effective approach, within which a new policy cycle in fighting serious and transnational criminal was adopted for the period of 2013–2017. The operational basis of the new cycle in future concrete operational plans was the SOCTA (Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment).²⁰

In the interim period (2010-2013), prior to the full policy cycle of 2013-2017, an initial, reduced cycle was initiated. The 2011 OCTA (Organised Crime Threat Assessment) provided the basis on which the Council agreed eight priorities for 2011-2013. These were translated into strategic goals, and eight EMPACT projects were launched to coordinate the ongoing action by Member States and EU organizations against the identified threats. The eight EMPACT projects decided upon in 2011 were: West Africa, Western Balkans, Facilitated illegal immigration, Synthetic drugs, Smuggling in shipping containers, Trafficking in human beings, Mobile (Itinerant) Organised Crime Groups and Cybercrime.^{21,22}

The SOCTA uses the definition of international organized crime provided by the Framework Decision on organized crime of 24 October

¹⁸ Europol, OCTA EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, 2006, 24.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁰ Council of the EU, “Council conclusions on the creation and implementation of a EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime”, Brussels, 8 and 9 November 2010.

²¹ European Police Office, *EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment*, 2013, 9. (SOKTA 2013).

²² More about SOKTA: (SOKTA 2013).

2008.²³ This Framework Decision defines a criminal organisation as “a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.

The SOCTA is a strategic report. It identifies and assesses threats, analyses vulnerabilities and opportunities for crime and includes findings specific to regions and Member States.

The aim of the SOCTA is to:

- analyse the character or threatening features of organized crime groups (OCGs);
- analyse the threatening features of serious and organized crime areas of activity (SOC areas);
- analyse threatening aspects of OCG and SOC areas by region;
- define the most threatening OCGs, criminal areas and their regional dimension.²⁴

The development of serious and organized crime threat assessments is, therefore, beneficial for a number of related reasons as they:

- Enable the government to more effectively protect the state and its people from the effects of serious and organized crime;
- Institutionalize procedures in which information on serious and organized crime can be more systematically collected, assessed and published;
- Are a crucial government and organizational policy making and management tool to identify priorities and guide decisions as to the allocation of resources;
- Will identify effective actions in terms of better prevention, intervention and partnerships;
- Are excellent monitoring tools when produced regularly;
- Provide a foundation on which other information and intelligence tools (for example the requirements for future criminal intelligence collection) can be built; and,
- Make an important contribution to a higher degree of transparency and provide a forum to involve relevant stakeholders (such as, for

²³ Council of the EU, Council Framework Decision, 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, OJL 300, 11. 11. 2008, 42.

²⁴ SOKTA 2013, 42.

- example, business groups and community leaders) in debates as to how serious and organized crime can be effectively countered;
- Provide a mechanism for promoting collaboration and cooperation across range of public and private sector organization stakeholders.²⁵

The policy cycle will last for four years and it consists of four key steps:

- 1. Step 1: SOCTA** – the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, developed by Europol delivers a set of recommendations based on an in-depth analysis of the major crime threats facing the EU.
- 2. Step 2: Policy-setting and decision making**- The Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers uses the recommendations of the SOCTA to define its priorities for the next four years. **MASP** - Multi-Annual Strategic Action Plans will be developed from the priorities in order to define the strategic goals for combating each priority threat (2013). These projects will set out yearly operational action plans (**OAPs**) to combat the priority threats. The first plans will be developed during 2013 to become operational in 2014.
- 3. Step 3: Implementation and monitoring** of annual OAP's on the basis of the MASPs using the framework of **EMPACT** (European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats). COSI invites the relevant MS and EU agencies to integrate the actions developed in the OAPs into their planning and strategy.
- 4. Step 4: Review and assessment** – the effectiveness of the OAPs and their impact on the priority threat will be reviewed. In the meantime, Europol continuously engages in horizon scanning to identify new threats and trends. In 2015, an interim threat assessment (SOCTA) will be prepared by Europol to evaluate, monitor and adjust (if required) the effort in tackling the priority threats.²⁶

3.1. Europol's Information Management Process

Exchange of information, especially information improved by appropriate analysis and unification, represents the main activity of Europol. This method of work provides support to police efforts and represents a fundamental work tool in criminal investigations and

²⁵ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Guidance on the use and preparation of serious and organized crime threat assessments – The SOCTA Handbook*, Vienna, 2010, 6.

²⁶ SOCTA 2013, 9.

tendencies in fighting organized crime.

Information management is a process based on raw information, which can be about a crime, perpetrator, suspected person, etc. Information management's objective is the enhancement of the basic information which provides additional knowledge about the activities of criminals. The result focused on is "*information designed for action*".²⁷

Europol – ECIM process can be presented as activities (cycle) in six steps: 1) *Collection*; 2) *Collation*; 3) *Evaluation*; 4) *Analysis*; 5) *Dissemination*; and 6) *Re-evaluation*.

Crucial to the function of this model is the safety of information distributed to Europol, therefore it is necessary to properly evaluate and label codes for transmission to Europol. Also, products distributed from Europol to Member States will, accordingly, be labeled using security codes and codes for information handling.

Evaluation codes are based on the *4x4 system* used in the Member States to establish the authenticity and accuracy of the supplied information. Evaluation codes consist of source codes and information codes.

3.2. Data Protection and Confidentiality

The purpose of data protection is to afford protection to the individual about whom data are processed. This is typically achieved through a combination of rights for the data subject and conditions for those who process data. Data protection within Europol is about creating a framework for Europol's information handling that appropriately takes care of the interests of the individual on whom law enforcement data are processed.

The level of protection of Europol information is a standardised format that indicates the protection measures that need to be applied to this information.

Three types of information can be identified:²⁸

1. **(Europol) public information:** information which is marked or is clearly recognisable as being public information. The decision to allocate the public status to information can only be taken by head of unit or department within Europol, or a person under his authority, where the information originates;
2. **Europol BPL information:** Basic Protection Level information (BPL);
3. **Europol classified information:** information subject to a special

²⁷ Europol, *Europol Information Management*, 7.

²⁸ Europol, *Europol Information Management*, 8.

security regime and marked with one of the classification levels:

- **Europol Restricted:** This level is applicable to information and material the unauthorized disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to the interests of Europol or of one or more Member States.
- **Europol Confidential:** This level is applicable to information and material the unauthorized disclosure of which could harm the essential interests of Europol or of one or more Member States.
- **Europol Secret:** This level is applicable only to information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essential interests of Europol or of one or more Member States.
- **Europol Top Secret:** This level is applicable only to information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of Europol or of one or more Member States.

4. Conclusion

The Treaty on European Union, apart from clear goals of promoting economic and social progress, envisages the implementation of the common foreign and security policy as well as the development of close cooperation on justice and home affairs. The latter goal implies a high level of political engagement among EU Member States and real efforts to develop a coherent approach. Such efforts are certainly necessary, considering the overall widening of criminal environment and facing new threats. Political focus directed only to solving financial issues seems insufficient and serious efforts are needed to establish new mechanisms of EU such as the strategic approach envisaged by the European Criminal Intelligence Model.

In the light of these considerations we believe that a functional European Criminal Intelligence Model would only be possible if the Member States law enforcement agencies would strengthen their efforts towards a full adoption and implementation of the concept of “Intelligence-Led Policing” which would also involve an organizational realignment by moving their focus from the investigative/reactive activities towards a preventive/information-based approach. At the EU level, the ECIM should be based on a common legal framework as regards the management of intelligence with unique procedures for collecting, evaluating, storing, analysing and disseminating intelligence which would also include the education/training dimension.

In the context of the orientation of Serbia towards integration into the European Union, and hence into the subsystem of the European Criminal Intelligence Model, it is necessary to carry out reforms of both

public administration and police in order to align with EU standards and models. Experiences of prosperous European countries, as well as the basis of the European Security Model presented in this paper, seem to be a reference base for the police reform and path towards the European Criminal Intelligence Model.

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ПУТ КА ЕВРОПСКОМ КРИМИНАЛИСТИЧКО- ОБАВЕШТАЈНОМ МОДЕЛУ

Резиме

Велики изазови које са собом доносе тешки економски и финансијски услови, а са друге стране тренд раста, софистицираности и глобализације организованог криминала, једнако утичу на државе чланице Европске уније, као и остале европске земље, те је стварање европског простора безбедности и правде потребније више него икада. Ово се може постићи кроз међусобну сарадњу и консолидацију прекограничне полицијске сарадње засноване на развоју националних полиција, интеграцију већ успостављеног оквира и инструмената Европске уније у области правосуђа и унутрашњих послова_ и јачање размене информација полицијских организација, а све у циљу имплементације Европског криминалистичко-обавештајног модела. Стога, овај рад има за циљ да анализира стање у погледу усвајања, развоја и имплементације Европског криминалистичко-обавештајног модела ЕСИМ као дела Стратегије Европске уније за унутрашњу безбедност. Ако се овоме дода чињеница да је један од приоритетних задатака наше државе, у склопу усаглашавања са прописима Европске уније, управо захтев за усаглашавање са Европским криминалистичко-обавештајним моделом, онда овај рад, посматрано са аспекта њеног доприноса, добија још више на значају. Допринос рада у овом домену нарочито треба ценити у светлу актуелног одсуства стратегије и јасног курса у спровођењу и имплементацији оваквог полицијског рада упркос европској (али и светској) актуелности.

Кључне речи: *Европски криминалистичко-обавештајни модел (ЕСИМ); криминалистичко-обавештајна делатност; Еуропол; СОСТА; полицијски рад вођен криминалистичко-обавештајним информацијама;*